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D aurait ete souhaitable que les deux auteurs attachent davantage d'importance 
aux politiques economiques et sociales, m~me deficientes, du gouvernement 
provisoire : celles-ci ne peuvent se resumer a l'image un peu caricaturale qu'ils 
dessinent de Skobelev, ministre du Travail, qui, tel un porn pier en etat de desarroi, se 
promene aux quatre coins de Ia Rossie afin d'etouffer des incendies qui risquent, 
autrement, de prendre les proportions d'une veritable catastrophe! Dans Ia m~me 
veine, si toutes les recriminations de Ia bourgeoisie d'affaires ne soot pas justifiables, 
il reste que !'agitation ouvriere, et plus particulierement Ia greve, contribuent, en 
1917, a reduire a Ia fois Ia production et Ia productivite eta accroltre I' inflation. 
La these de ce livre -Ia greve en tant que matrice et accelerateur du processus 
revolutionnaire- est interessante, mais elle reste, toutefois, discutable: l'arbi'e tend 
a cacher Ia foret ! La poursuite de Ia guerre mondiale, I' etat lamentable de I' economie 
(inflation, crise des transports, insuffisance des approvisionnements en vivres, en 
matieres premieres et en combustibles),les initiatives peu fructueuses du gouverne-
ment provisoire en vue de solutionner ces problemes majeurs ainsi que le role joue 
par les differents partis politiques, les soviets, les comites d'usine, les milices 
ouvrieres et les syndicats ont certainement contribue autant, sinon davantage que Ia 
greve, a mobiliser Ia classe ouvriere et a developper, chez elle comme chez les 
(( mechants bourgeois », one conscience de classe. 
Finalement, 1'histoire quantitative a ses adeptes ( et ce livre, farci de tableaux et 
de graphiques, en est un exemple eloquent), mais elle a aussi ses limites: !'approche 
statistique,l' analyse tres sophistiquee des donnees ecartent un peu trop du devant de 
Ia scene le greviste lui-m~me. Comment a-t-il vecu Ia greve? Les quelques rares 
exemples de greves relates par Koenker et Rosenberg ne repondent pas adequatement 
a cette question. La chose est d'autant plus surprenante que toute l'etude s'inscrit 
ouvertement dans Ia tendance historiographique actuelle Ia plus interessante : celle 
qui consiste a voir Ia revolution de 1917 comme un vaste mouvement de protestation 
sociale et politique de Ia part de Ia base (paysans, ouvriers, soldats et nationalistes non 
russes). 
*** 
Jean-Guy Lalande 
St. Francis Xavier University 
Seymour Martin Lipset - Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of 
the United States and Canada, foreword by Robert G. Nichols and Adam H. 
Zimmerman, co-chairmen, Canadian-American Committee. Toronto and 
Washington: C.D. Howe Institute (Canada) and National Planning Association 
(USA),l989. Pp. xviii, 326. 
Both the author and his argument are well-known to students of Canadian 
society. The American Revolution, Lipset believes, created a permanent ideological 
division between the United States and Canada While American Whigs set up a 
liberal republic rooted in anti-statist, Lockean ideology, fleeing Loyalists established 
a more conservative state in Canada based on an organic, monarchical tradition. 
Succeeding generations in both nations have inherited the relatively unmodified 
ideological consequences of the Revolution. 
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Articulated during the 1950s and 1960s by scholars on both sides of the border, 
including Louis Hartz, Daniel Bell, Frank Underhill, S.D. Clark, and Lipset himself, 
this interpretation reflects the convergence of several Cold War-inspired intellectual 
trends. They include the idea of national character, the belief in American excep-
tionalism, and the practice of equilibrium social analysis. As a youth educated at New 
York's City College, then a hotbed of radicalism, Lipset had originally set out to 
explain why socialism had succeeded in Saskatchewan in order to understand better 
why it had failed in the United States. The implicit cross-border contrasts of Agrarian 
Socialism ( 1950) led to explicit comparisons of the U.S., U.K. and Canada in The First 
New Nation (1963) that proved America's classless exceptionalism to the author's 
satisfaction. 
Nearly three decades later, extending this delineation of the similarities and 
differences between Canada and the United States, Lipset's book may go down in 
North American historiography as one of the last testaments to the Cold War-inspired 
creed. 
The author asserts that the values and culture of Canada and the United States 
"vary in consistent ways across a broad spectrum of role behavior, institutions, and 
values" (xiv [emphasis in original]). He presents two kinds of evidence: quotations 
from literary, historical, and social scientist "authorities", and various public opinion 
polls conducted since World War II. The frrst three chapters, based largely on the 
authorities, examine the impact of the clash between Whigs and Tories during the 18th 
century on the formation afterward of two distinct national characters. Although 
Lipset draws upon the observations of such 19th-century writers as Engels and Bryce, 
most of his authorities date from the post-World War II years. He quotes extensively 
from a good many of their works, including his own, all compiled at the end of the 
book in a bibliography of more than five hundred items covering over thirty pages. 
The remaining eight chapters, drawn largely from contemporary poll data, explore the 
consequences of the American Revolution by comparing attitudes on Canadian and 
American law, literature, religion, politics, economy, and society. For the most part, 
the book is an elaboration rather than a revision of the author's previous studies. 
According to Lipset, the American Revolution established a series of ideo-
logical dichotomies in North America, each measurable on a continuum by which the 
researcher can locate and compare American and Canadian national values. 
Americans, he says, are basically egalitarian; Canadian more hierarchical. American 
populism contrasts with Canadian elitism; American individualism stands out against 
a greater Canadian stress on community values. Americans engage in private 
enterprise; Canadins rely more heavely upon government-owned public corporations. 
For recent in-migrants, the American melting pot contrasts with the Canadian mosaic. 
While Lipset takes pains to point out the shifts occurring with these categories during 
the past few years, he periodically emphasizes (but fails to examine) the overall 
structural similarities between the two peoples. Although polls reveal only a 5-10 
percent difference between the two populations across a wide range of the values, the 
U.S., he maintains, is still basically Whig, and Canada remains a Tory nation despite 
evidence that some national differences may be shrinking. 
Lipset's argument is riddled with difficulties. If, as he concedes, structural 
features shared by Canada and the United States delineate fundamental similarities, 
to what extent does the book represent "the narcissism of small differences"? Or take 
the poll data: if 48 percent of Candians say that they think of themselves as "belonging 
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to a particular social class", but only 42 percent of Americans say so, is this 
satisfactory proof of the greater class-consciousness of Canadians? The author puts 
more ideological weight on his data than it can support, especially after conceding that 
some evidence is not reliable or definitive. In a few cases, he explains away polls that 
contradict his thesis. 
As for the "authorities", some are obviously well-informed, but many assess-
ments are diluted by their off-hand or anecdotal quality. For instance, an (unnamed) 
American auto executive is quoted observing that Canadian advertising was different 
because "the Canadian buyer is much more cost conscious ... than the American"(l27). 
Occasionally, Lipset cites authors whose conclusions parrot his previous publications. 
A few like Gad Horowitz and Martin Robin are misidentified as historians. 
So broad and all-encompassing an argument that relies so heavily upon one key 
historical event (the American Revolution) ought not to be marred by ignorance of 
recent historiographical revision. Actually, Lipset's view of the American Revolution, 
popular three decades ago, has been under siege for some time. We now know that 
most Loyalists never left the United States. Scholars such as Jane Errington have 
seriously undermined the notion of a post-Revolutionary ideological barrier 
separating the Whigs who stayed in the United States from the Tories who left for 
Canada. 
While the author's explanation of the origins of value differences relies upon 
the outcome of the Revolutionary War, most of his evidence is ahistorically derived 
from the postwar era. As a result, what emerges is an essentially static picture of both 
national identities until World War II at least, with only slight variations detected since 
then. The French "fact" is barely ackowledged. There is no recognition, let alone any 
assessment, of the impact of such discrete events as the Civil War, the execution of 
Louis Riel, or the wartime conscription crises on the evolution of either the American 
or Canadian "national" identities. The consequences of this deficiency became 
glaringly apparent at the end of the book when the author asks whether cross-border 
differences are a cause or a consequence of the greater political regionalism in 
Canada. Because he lacks an adequate historical perspective, Lipset finds the question 
"almost impossible to answer, except by saying that the factors were interdependent" 
(208). Only within the greatly foreshortened postwar framework can Lipset 
persuasively delineate the recent convergence of some Canadian and American values 
on gender and ethnic issues. 
In short, this book presents a smoothly written, up-to-date version of an argu-
ment whose time may have past No doubt, a few scholars will still fmd the approach 
useful. But its method of explanation is open to question, and its dated intellectual 
assumptions are no longer embraced by a good many historians or social scientists. 
*** 
Robert Babcock 
University of Maine 
